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US. Rules Limiting Defamation Actions

A DEFENCE OF THE ASPIRATIONS - BUT NOT THE
ACHIEVEMENTS - OF THE U.S. RULES
LIMITING DEFAMATION ACTIONS BY
PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR PUBLIC FIGURES

by Nadine Strossen*
[In light of the recent controversy in Australia concerning defamation suits by public figures,
the author in an address delivered during the 23rd Australian Legal Convention discusses the
American landmark decision New York Times v. Sullivan; its implicationsand effect on American
defamation law. The generalprincipleunderlying this decision is that defamation actionsinvolving
public officials or figures should be subject to special limitations, to encouragefreedom of the
press. The Court declaredthat a public official could not recover damages unless he proved the
defamatory statement was made with "actual malice." The author defends the decision from
criticism that it creates an inequality between public officials and other citizens, and continues
to discuss the actualeffect of Sullivan andpossible reforms to the law which could more effectively
enact its principles.]

INTRODUCTION

The legal rules governing defamation actions by public officials or public
figures have been the subject of much debate in Australia recently. Such actions
constitute a high percentage of the overall civil litigation docket in many
Australian courts. Various new rules have been proposed, at both the national
level and within individual Australian states, which would modify the common
law defamation principles governing these actions.
One reform proposal under consideration is that Australia adopt the special
defamation rules that the United States Supreme Court has promulgated for
defamation actions brought by public officials or public figures, or involving
matters of public concern. With the goal of assisting in the evaluation of
Australian reform proposals that are modeled after the United States rules,
this paper discusses those rules from both theoretical and practical
perspectives. Readers are invited to draw their own conclusions as to any
implications that these observations might have for the Australian situation.

* Assistant Professor and Supervising Attorney, Civil Rights Clinic, New York University School
of Law. This paper is based upon Professor Strossen's presentation at the session on 'Defamation
of Public Figures' during the 23rd Australian Legal Convention in Melbourne on August 8, 1985.
It responds to the paper by Mr. T.E.E Hughes, Q.C., which criticized the United States rules
imposing special limitations upon defamation actions by public officials or public figures. The
author gratefully acknowledges the Faculty of Law and Dean Robert Baxt of Monash University,
Mr. Henry von Bibra, and Mr. Anthony F. Smith, for facilitating this presentation. The author
is also grateful to New York University Law Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, who provided
insights into defamation law, and New York University law student Michael Rogoff, who provided
research assistance.
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Part I explains and defends the general principle enunciated in New York
Times v. Sullivan' and other leading defamation decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court: that defamation actions involving public officials, public figures, or
matters of public concern should be subject to special limitations to encourage
freedom of the press. In particular, Part I responds to two common criticisms
of this general principle: that it creates an unjustifiable inequality between
public officials or public figures and other defamation plaintiffs; and that
it is inconsistent with general tort law concepts.
Part II demonstrates that the free press principles underlying Sullivan and
its progeny have not in fact been adequately promoted by the legal standards
embodied in these cases. The concern expressed by some critics of the United
States defamation rules, that they tilt the law too far in favor of press freedom,
and against the reputational interests of public officials and public figures,
is unwarranted in light of the actual experience under such rules. Twenty years
after Sullivan, there is scant evidence that defamed public officials or figures
are deprived of legal redress. To the contrary, there is substantial evidence
that the press and other media are not sufficiently protected from the economic
and associated free speech burdens imposed by defamation litigation.
Part III offers some theories as to why the Sullivan rules have not effectively
promoted the Sullivan goals, and Part IV suggests some alternative measures
that might more effectively promote those goals.
I. THE GOALS UNDERLYING THE SULLIVAN RULES LIMITING DEFAMATION
ACTIONS BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR FIGURES

In 1964, in the landmark decision of New York Times v. Sullivan,2 the U.S.
Supreme Court for the first time evaluated common law defamation standards
in light of the fundamental principles expressed in the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech and of the press.'
The Court declared that it was considering the case against a background
of 'a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open!' The Court recognized
that some erroneous statements are inevitable in such a free debate, and
therefore that even such erroneous statements 'must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the "breathing space" that they "need to
survive' ,"Another way this concept is often expressed is that it is not enough
for laws simply not to prohibit free expression outright; they must go further
and avoid any deterrent or 'chilling' effect on free speech.'

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

2 Ibid.

U.S. CONST. Amend. I. It provides, in pertinent part: 'Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... This provision is also binding upon state
governments. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
4 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964.)
5 Ibid. 271-72 (quoting N.A.A.C.P v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
6 See generally Tribe, L., American Constitutional Law (1978) § 12-12, 634.
3
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In Sullivan, the Supreme Court found that the common law defamation
rules - which held a defendant strictly liable for words that tended to defame
the plaintiff - had an impermissible chilling effect on freedom of the press,
by inducing members of the press to engage in 'self-censorship' even of
accurate statements in order to avoid liability.7 To prevent this chilling effect
or self-censorship, the Court declared that a public official could not recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood regarding his official conduct unless
he proved that the statement was made with what the Court termed 'actual
malice' - i.e., 'with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.8
One rationale for Sullivan's limitation upon defamation suits by public
officials was to bring them into parity with defamation suits against public
officials. Both the federal and the state governments in the United States had
long granted immunity to government officials, absolutely shielding them from
defamation suits based upon statements made in connection with their official
duties. This immunity has been viewed as necessary to prevent government
officials from being inhibited in the vigorous administration of government
policy.' The Sullivan Court concluded, however, that this one-way defamation
immunity was unfair!0
The pre-Sullivan non-mutual immunity is one factor that belies the
contention, which is made by some Sullivan critics, that the Sullivan rule
creates an inequality between public officials and other defamation plaintiffs.
To the contrary, Sullivan removed such an inequality. Before that decision,
government officials were unequally favored by United States defamation law.
On the one hand, government officials were immune from defamation suits
that arose from their official conduct. On the other hand, if a private citizen
should criticize the official conduct of a public officer, he or she could be
held strictly liable for defamation.
The pre-Sullivan inequality between public officials and other citizens was
not only inconsistent with general notions of fairness. Even worse, it was

' 376 U.S. 254, 279.

8 Ibid. 279-80. To remedy the chilling effect that public officials' defamation actions had
upon freedom of the press, counsel for the New York Times argued that such actions should
be absolutely barred. In the alternative, the New York Times counsel advocated rules that would
allow these actions to be maintained, but were designed to limit their damaging impact upon
freedom of the press. One proposed rule was the 'actual malice' standard, which had been adopted
by several states. Another suggested rule was to limit a public official's recovery to the amount
of actual financial injury demonstrated to have been caused by the defamation. Brief for Petitioner
at 51-54. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86 (recommending that damage recoveries in
defamation actions by public officials or figures should be limited to actual financial injuries
caused by the defamation). The written and oral arguments presented on behalf of the New York
Times are recounted in Lewis, 'New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment"', 83 Col. L. Rev. 603, 605-608 (1983).
9 See Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (holding statement of federal official to be
absolutely privileged, and not subject to defamation claim, so long as it is made 'within the
outer perimeter' of his or her duties). The states accord the same immunity to statements of
at least their highest officers. See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83.
'0 376 U.S. 254, 282-83.
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inconsistent with the most basic premises underlying the United States'
democratic form of government. As stated by James Madison, one of the
nation's Founding Fathers, in the United States, 'the censorial power is in
the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people'"
Moreover, in the American political system, the citizen is regarded as having
not only a right, but also a duty, to criticize government officials!2 For these
reasons, the Sullivan opinion concluded that '[i]t
would give public servants
an unjustified preference over the public they serve, if critics of official conduct
did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials
themselves' 3
Subsequent to Sullivan, the Supreme Court extended the actual malice
requirement to cases involving 'public figures'" The definition of public figures
for purposes of this doctrine lacks optimal clarity. However, the trend in the
Supreme Court's decisions has been to focus and to narrow the concept1
Specifically, the Court has clarified that there are two types of public figures:
(1) general purpose public figures - those who 'occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes'; and (2) limited purpose public figures - those who 'have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved' 6
The rationale underlying the Court's extension of the actual malice
requirement to public figures underscores additional flaws in the contention
of some critics that this requirement creates inequalities. To the contrary, this
rule is designed to lessen certain inequalities that would otherwise exist between
public figures and other defamation plaintiffs.
On a pragmatic level, as the Supreme Court noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,7 both public officials and public figures would probably enjoy more
access than private individuals have to channels of effective communication.
In consequence, public officials and public figures generally have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements. Private individuals are
therefore more vulnerable to injury from defamation, and the state interest
in protecting them from such injury is correspondingly greater.8
The Supreme Court found even more persuasive a second, normative
distinction that sets public officials and figures apart from private individuals.
In seeking the public limelight, the Court said, the public official or figure

" Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, 4 J. Elliot Debates on the Federal Constitution
of 1787, 553-54 (1876), quoted in Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282.
,2 376 US. 254, 282.
'3 Ibid. 282-83.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, and Associated Press Inc. v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
"5See, e.g., Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. I1 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
14

U.S. 323 (1974).
16 Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 345.
17

418 U.S. 323.

"s Ibid. 344-45.
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should be deemed to accept certain necessary consequences, including the
risk of closer public scrutiny and criticism. This is simply a manifestation
of the venerable common law concept of assumption of the risk. The public
official or figure has assumed a greater risk of being the subject of defamatory
statements than has the private individual!9 Therefore, to make it more difficult
for the former than the latter to recover for defamation is simply a fair
reflection, in accordance with fundamental common law precepts, of the preexisting inequality between them. It does not create a new inequality.
Because private individuals do not assume such a great risk of defamation,
and because they have less access to channels for effectively counteracting
defamation, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that
private plaintiffs could recover damages for actual injuries caused by
defamation merely by showing negligence.2" However, the Gertz decision
further held that, where the defamation relates to a matter of public concern,
even a private plaintiff cannot recover presumed or punitive damages without
showing actual malice.2 ' The rationale for this holding points to another flaw
in the arguments commonly advanced by critics of the post-Sullivan United
States defamation rules. Such critics often contend that these rules create a
distinction between the principles governing defamation and those governing
other torts. In actuality, however, these rules were necessary to eliminate such
a distinction. Specifically, as the Court stated in Gertz, '[t]he common law
of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly
compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss122 Instead, 'the
existence of injury is presumed from the [mere] fact of publication: thus leaving
juries free to 'award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage
to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred" 3
The anomalous doctrine of presumed damages for defamation is
inconsistent with the fundamental axioms of tort law that a plaintiff should
be allowed to recover damages only upon proof that he actually incurred
injuries, and that these injuries were proximately caused by the alleged tortious

9 Ibid. Even the seminal Warren and Brandeis article on privacy, which may well be the
foremost exposition of individual right to legal redress for publications about them, recognizes
this distinction between public and private figures:
There are persons who may reasonably claim as a right, protection from the notoriety entailed
by being made the victim of journalistic enterprise. There are others who, in varying degrees,
have renounced the right to live their lives screened from public observation.
Warren & Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 215 (1890).
20 Ibid. 347. The Court subsequently held that emotional distress alone could constitute 'actual
injury' under the Gertz standard. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
21 Ibid. 348-50. Gertz did not expressly decide what showing would be necessary for a private
plaintiff's recovery of presumed or punitive damages where the defamation does not relate to
a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court first resolved that issue in its subsequent Dun
& Bradstreet decision, discussed infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
22 Ibid. 349.
23 Ibid.
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conduct.2" These basic rules reflect, in part, the absence of any public interest
in facilitating tort plaintiffs' recoveries of money damages in excess of their
actual injuries. There is no greater public interest in facilitating gratuitous
recoveries for defamation than for any other tort. To the contrary, there is
a particularly powerful public interest in preventing gratuitous recoveries in
defamation actions. As the Supreme Court noted in Gertz, the peculiar
doctrine of presumed damages in defamation actions invites juries 'to punish
unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injuries sustained
by the publication of the false fact!25 Thus, this doctrine 'compounds the
potential' of defamation cases 'to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First
26
Amendment freedoms
In a decision issued during its 1984-1985 Term, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,27 the Supreme Court added a further refinement
to the principles delineated in the Sullivan line of cases. For the first time,
the Court expressly addressed an issue that had been implicated, but not
directly presented, in the Gertz case: the degree of fault that a private plaintiff
must show to recover presumed or punitive damages for defamation regarding
matters not of public concern. The Court clarified that, in such cases, a private
plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages (as well as damages
for actual injuries caused by the defamation) merely by showing negligencc. 8
Thus, in defamation actions brought by private individuals, the actual malice
requirement for recovery of presumed or punitive damages is limited to speech
regarding matters of public concern. This limitation is logical for two principal
reasons. First, there is a particularly great public interest in curbing selfcensorship of speech regarding matters of public concern. Second, when such
matters are involved, the subject of the alleged defamation should more readily
be able to publicize his or her version of the relevant facts, because matters
of public concern by definition are of special interest to the media.
Insofar as they provide greater protection for speech regarding matters of
public concern, the defamation principles embodied in Sullivan and its progeny
are at least arguably harmonious with common law negligence concepts.
According to the Restatement of Torts, which summarizes the common law
principles followed in the majority of states in the United States, conduct
is negligent if the risk of harm it entails outweighs its social utility.29 So, the
greater the social utility, the lower the degree of care required. Accordingly,

24 See Anderson,
(1984) (even when
constitutional torts,
actual harm).
23 418 U.S. 323,

'Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 747, 748-49
plaintiffs may recover presumed damages for other common law or
such damages are only nominal, unless plaintiff proves that the tort caused
349.

26 Ibid.
27 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985).
2s Ibid. 2948.
29 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291 (1965). The Restatement formulation is essentially
the same as Judge Learned Hand's classic formula for determining whether conduct is negligent,
see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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because greater social utility attaches to speech respecting matters of public
concern than other speech,3" the common law itself should impose a lower
standard of care as a condition for engaging in such speech.
For the reasons stated above, the principles enunciated in the Sullivan line
of cases are consistent with - and, indeed, mandated by - the paramount
importance of free speech and press in the United States' legal-political system.
In particular, these principles reflect the supreme importance of free criticism
of public officials and figures, and free comment about matters of public
concern.
The United States' legal system is also very respectful of the individual's
right to protect his or her good name. As stated by the Supreme Court, the
protection that the United States' legal system accords to individual
reputational interests 'reflects ... our basic concept of the dignity and worth
of every human being - a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty" 3' However, as the Court further stated in the same opinion, free speech
and press values require that, 'in order to protect speech that matters', we must
also 'protect some falsehood' and other speech that would not independently
be worthy of protection. 2 The Supreme Court thus regards the consequence
of this necessity - that individuals' reputational interests regarding matters
of public concern are not as easily vindicated as they would be under the
common law system - as a price well worth paying for robust, wide-ranging
debate on such matters.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE SULLIVAN RULES TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVELY THEIR
UNDERLYING GOALS

The laudable goals underlying the Sullivan decision - to increase press
freedom by decreasing burdensome defamation claims - have not in fact
been promoted through the actual malice rule that Sullivan devised in an effort
to advance these goals.
Most journalists had expected that Sullivan would cause considerable
declines both in the number of defamation cases filed, and in their success
rate. In response to these anticipated declines, according to some distinguished
journalists, immediately after Sullivan the media 'moved... into a period
of exuberant and probing coverage, frequently poking into areas that might
not have been reported at all, or reported rather differently before Sullivan.33
In fact, the journalists' expectations about Sullivan appeared to be borne out

30 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2946 (1985)
(speech on matters of public concern is more important under First Amendment than speech
on matters of purely private concern); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ('speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government'); Roth
v. UnitedStates, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (purposes of First Amendment is 'to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people').
3 Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)).
32 Ibid. 341.
33 Abel, 'The First Amendment Is Under Attack Both at Home and Abroad: 3 Communications
Law 3 (1985).
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by the decision's immediate aftermath. For years after the Sullivan decision,
public officials won virtually no defamation recoveries. 3"
However, today - two decades after Sullivan - the anticipated decreases
in defamation actions and recoveries by public officials or figures clearly have
not materialized. Three major recent defamation suits by public officials or
public figures, which involved huge damage claims and protracted litigation,
are symptomatic of broader trends in the past decade: Sharon v. Time, Inc.,"
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,36 and Tavoulareas v. Washington Post.3" Neither
public officials nor public figures appear reluctant to press defamation claims
against media defendants, notwithstanding the actual malice standard.
Moreover, these plaintiffs generally seek, and often recover, large damage
awards. Although defendants ultimately prevail in approximately two-thirds
of all defamation cases, many such victories occur only at the appellate level
of litigation, following defendants' expenditure of large, unrecoupable sums
for attorneys' fees, and the diversion of substantial amounts of time from
defendants' primary, journalistic pursuits.3"
These trends have been thoroughly documented by an organization called
the 'Libel Defence Resource Center' or 'LDRC', an information clearinghouse
that was organized by media groups to monitor developments in defamation
litigation. According to the LDRC, media defendants lost fifty-four per cent
34
3"

Lewis, supra note 8, 608.

The former Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, claimed $50 million (U.S.) in damages
concerning an allegedly defamatory passage in a Time Magazine article. Sharon claimed that
the passage accused him of knowingly pen itting or encouraging the murder of Palestinian refugees
at camps in West Beirut, Lebanon. In res onse to the judge's special verdict questionnaire, the
jury found that the challenged passage had a defamatory meaning and was false. N.Y Times,
Jan. 25, 1985. However, judgment was entered for the magazine because the jury found that
it did not act with 'actual malice' In announcing the jury's conclusion that Time Magazine had
not acted with the necessary degree of fault, the foreman also read the following statement: 'We
find ... that certain Time employees ... acted negligently and carelessly in reporting and verifying
the information which ultimately found its way into the published paragraph of interest in this
case NY Times, Jan. 25, 1985. The case produced three reported decisions concerning pre-trial
issues, see 596 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying defendant's motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment); 103 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (ruling on various discovery issues); 10 Med. L. Rptr.
1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
36 Former U.S. General William Westmoreland claimed $120 million (U.S.) in damages from
the television network concerning a televised documentary. Westmoreland contended that the
broadcast's central theme was that he had led a conspiracy to suppress and distort intelligence
reports about the size of the enemy forces in Vietnam. After five months of trial, shortly before
the case would have gone to the jury, the parties entered into a settlement: no money was exchanged,
and the parties agreed to a joint statement containing certain mutual acknowledgments of each
other's good faith. NY Times Feb. 19, 1985. The case produced one reported decision concerning
pre-trial issues, see 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment).
The President and Chief Executive Officer of Mobil Oil Corporation and his son sued
the newspaper (and other defendants) over a story alleging that the father had misused his position
and corporate assets to benefit his son. The jury returned verdicts of $2.05 million (U.S.) for
plaintiffs, but the trial judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendants.
567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983). A panel of the appellate court reversed, holding that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict against the newspaper defendants, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). Defendants sought a rehearing by the appellate court en banc, which was granted.
763 F.2d 1472, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
38 Libel Defense Resource Center, [Herein after referred to as "LDRC"], Bull. No. 11,
Defamation Trials, Damage Awards and Appeals: Two-Year Update (1982-1984). See also Infra
note 63 and accompanying text.
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of the defamation cases that were tried during the period 1982-1984,1 9 and
the compensatory damage awards averaged more than two million U.S.
dollars."' In that two-year period, compensatory damage awards exceeded one
million U.S. dollars in approximately one-third of all cases. In contrast, before
1980, there had been only one damage award of one million U.S. dollars in
the entire history of United States defamation litigation."' Punitive damages
were awarded in almost sixty per cent of the defamation cases tried during
the 1982-1984 period, and these punitive damage awards averaged more than
2.9 million U.S. dollars. 2
Notwithstanding the actual malice showing that public officials and figures
must make to prevail in defamation cases, their record of victories and damage
awards has been comparable to that of defamation plaintiffs generally. In
the 1982-1984 period, fifty-five per cent of the defamation trials concluded
against media defendants were instituted by public officials or public figures.
These plaintiffs won more than fifty per cent of their cases at the trial level." 3
Following trial, approximately thirty percent of them recovered compensatory
damages of one million U.S. dollars or more, and the same percentage
4
recovered punitive damages of that magnitude."
According to the available data, both the loss rates and the damage awards
faced by defamation defendants significantly exceed the corresponding figures
for civil litigation defendants generally, as well as for defendants in other areas
of civil litigation where plaintiffs have been faring relatively well - namely,
medical malpractice and products liability. For example, a survey of all civil
jury trials in a large United States county during the period 1960-1979 - which
was apparently the largest survey of civil jury trials ever undertaken in the
United States - revealed that the defendants' overall victory rate was thirty
per cent higher than defendants' victory rate in all defamation cases during
the period for which such figures are available, 1976-1983." 5 More current,
nationwide data demonstrate that the average compensatory damage award
in defamation cases during the period 1980-1982 - more than two million
U.S. dollars - is approximately three times the average compensatory damage
award in products liability cases (approximately $786,000 U.S.) and medical
malpractice cases (approximately $666,000 U.S.) during the same period.4 6
" Ibid. 6.
Ibid. 14.
Ibid. 12.

40

41

42

Ibid. 15.

43 Ibid. 10.
44 Ibid. 16.

4' LDRC, Bull. No. 9, Juries and Damages: Comparing the Media's Libel Experience
to Other
Civil Litigations,24-25 (1984). The Institute for Civil Justice, an adjunct of the Rand Corporation,
surveyed 9,000 civil jury trials in Cooke County, Illinois, in both state and federal courts. This
was apparently the largest survey of civil jury trials ever undertaken in the United States. Although
the plaintiffs' success rates varied significantly as between different causes of action, and also
over time, none of these rates approached the corresponding rates of plaintiffs' jury trial victories
in defamation actions. Ibid. (citing Peterson, and Priest, 'The Civil Jury: Trends in Trials and
Verdicts, Cooke County, Illinois, 1960-1979' (1982) FIC Quarterly 361).
46 Ibid. 26 (citing Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Injury Valuation Reports, Current
Award Trends,
No. 270 (Solon, Ohio 1983)).
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To put these numbers in the proper perspective, it must be borne in mind
that, 'to the extent there is any actual injury' 7 as a result of defamation, such
injury 'is rarely of a quality or degree comparable to the massive physical
impact and permanent, costly physical debilitation so often caused by medical
malpractice or by defective, dangerous products!' 8
Ironically, in countries that extend less protection to freedom of expression,
and more protection to reputational interests, than does the United States,
defamation damage awards on the scale of recent such awards in the United
States are unknown. For example, although United States journalists say they
fear Great Britain's relatively strict defamation rules, the largest defamation
judgment known to have been paid in Britain as of 1983 was for 100,000
pounds, which was approximately 150,000 U.S. dollars. 9 By United States
standards, this is a small award, equivalent to only less than eight per cent
of the average compensatory damage award assessed in United States
defamation trials during the period 1982-1984.10
Burdensome as post-Sullivan defamation damage awards are in the United
States, they are nevertheless estimated to constitute only about twenty per
cent of the total expenses incurred in defending defamation actions, with the
remaining eighty per cent going to attorneys' fees and costs." And, in the
American civil litigation system, the prevailing party almost never has a right
to collect these sums from the unsuccessful party. 2 Mirroring the trend towards
increasing damages and costs in defending defamation actions, defamation
insurance rates in the United States have also risen sharply in the past few
years, a trend that is expected to continue."
Perhaps an even more costly burden borne by defamation defendants,
beyond their large, unrecoupable litigation expenditures, is the diversion of
substantial amounts of time from their primary, journalistic pursuits.14 For
all of these reasons, media defendants are inevitably economic losers - and,
LDRC, Bull. No. 9, supra note 45, 27. See also infra text accompanying note 65.
LDRC, Bull. No. 9, supra note 45, 27. See also ibid. (citing Jury Verdict Research, Inc.,
supra note 46)('[T]he jury's decision to grant' awards of one million U.S. dollars or more in a
medical malpractice or product liability case 'is usually based upon testimony presenting legitimate
computations of the plaintiff's projected lost earnings and the medical expenses necessary to
sustain him for life').
'9 Lewis, supra note 8, 615-16.
"0 See, supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
" See, e.g., Guzda, 'Dealing With Libel Suits, Editor& PublisherMay 11, 1985, 16; Newsom,
'Insurance: Presstime, Mar. 1985, 16, 18.
52 See, e.g., Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. Local 112, United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
456 U.S. 717, 721 (1982) ('Under the American rule, it is well established that attorneys' fees
are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefor'
(quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)). The
economic burden that defamation defendants face is inequitable in that plaintiffs can - and
usually do - avoid out-of-pocket expenditures for attorneys' fees by being represented on
contingency fee bases. See infra text accompanying note 71. Moreover, when defamation plaintiffs
prevail, juries can impose punitive damage awards against defendants as a means of requiring
defendants to bear the burden of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. No such fee-shifting device is available
when defamation defendants prevail. See infra note 91. These factors underscore that, under
the current American law, the defamation defendant faces a greater risk than the plaintiff.
3 See, e.g. Newsom, supra note 51.
5 See Lewis, supra note 8, 611-612. See also infra note 63 and accompanying text.
4'
48
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still more significantly, losers in terms of free press concerns - even if they
ultimately emerge from the litigation as technical legal victors.
One would certainly expect that the trends described above would result
in precisely the chilling or self-censorship effect that the Sullivan actual malice
standard was designed to prevent. A nationwide survey of reporters, editors,
and media lawyers that was discussed in the May-June 1985 issue of the
ColumbiaJournalismReview confirmed that the recent spate of defamation
litigation has indeed chilled the vigor and openness of the press." This
phenomenon was observed not just among smaller news organizations, but
also among major news organizations. 6 According to the Columbia survey,
actual or threatened defamation litigation has driven some newspapers to
abandon investigative journalism altogether; others have abandoned certain
reporting techniques; and still others are focusing on topics that they perceive
as less likely to generate defamation claims."
III. REASONS FOR FAILURE OF SULLIVAN RULES TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVELY
THEIR UNDERLYING GOALS

How did this decreased press freedom come about? Why the remarkable
resilience of defamation claims by public officials and public figures? And
why have these claims had such a chilling effect, notwithstanding the actual
malice standard? There are several factors at play, each pointing to reforms
that would assist in transforming Sullivan's aspiration of increasing press
freedom into a reality.
First, the discrepancy between jury verdicts for plaintiffs and appellate court
reversals58 indicates that judges may not be adequately instructing juries about
the Sullivan standards. The Tavoulareascase, which was brought by Mobil
Oil Company's Chief Executive Officer and his son against The Washington
Post,59 illustrates this phenomenon. Extensive post-verdict interviews with the
jurors in that case suggested that they found for plaintiffs because they
concluded that the Post had not proven the truth of every detail of the
challenged story. When asked what the verdict would have been if the issue
were whether the Post had acted intentionally or recklessly, the jurors indicated
that the newspaper would have won.6" Yet, under Sullivan, that is of course
precisely the issue that the jurors should have decided.
This disturbing example underscores the importance of judges' taking an
active role in defamation cases, to ensure that jurors understand and
implement the Sullivan standards. The excellent jury instructions issued by

55 Massing, 'The Libel Chill: How Cold Is It Out There?" May-June 1985 Col. Journ. Rev. 31.
16

Ibid. 38.

7 Ibid. 43.
38 Of the concluded appeals from lower court judgments in favor of defamation plaintiffs
between 1980 and 1984 (most of which involved jury trials), forty-seven per cent were reversed,
with judgment entered for defendants. In an additional eight per cent of these cases, a new trial
was ordered, and in another eight per cent, the damage award was reduced on appeal. LDRC
Bulletin No. 11, supra note 38, 20.
59 See supra note 37.
60 See Lewis, supra note 8, 612 (citing American Lawyer, November 1982, at 1, 93-94).
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Judge Sofaer in Sharon v. Time, Inc., as well as the special verdict
questionnaire he required the jurors to answer, demonstrate how a judge can
effectively facilitate a jury's adherence to the Sullivan standards.
There are also intrinsic problems with the actual malice standard, which
cause it to have a negative impact on press freedom even if the jury fully
understands and adheres to the standard. By making the central issue in
defamation cases the reporter's or publisher's state of mind, Sullivan and its
progeny have subjected editorial and thinking processes to extensive scrutiny.
Before Sullivan, the media had successfully contended that such materials
as reporters' notes and drafts were privileged and not subject to discovery.
Because the disputed issues in common law defamation cases were only truth
or falsity and reputational injury, these materials were essentially irrelevant.6 '
However, as the Supreme Court ruled in 1979, in Herbert v. Lando,6" the actual
malice standard elevates such materials to central relevance. Therefore, a
publication's editorial processes, and the individual reporter's thought
processes, are now subject to intense and prolonged evaluation. Largely due
to this painstaking dissection of how a story was prepared, contemporary
defamation litigation is characterized by protracted pre-trial discovery, as well
as lengthy trials. Consequently, defamation defendants face very large
attorneys' fees and other litigation costs.63
Further light is shed on why Sullivan's actual malice rule has, ironically,
had a negative impact on the freedom of the press, by a study that was
conducted at the University of Iowa and is known as the 'Iowa Research
Project!" Based upon extensive analysis of all defamation suits in the past
ten years, this study concluded that the motivation of most defamation
plaintiffs in general - and of almost all public official or public figure
plaintiffs in particular - is to correct a falsehood and to vindicate their
reputations, not to recover money damages. The Iowa Research Project
reported that plaintiffs' interest in reputational vindication is supreme because
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See Lewis, supra note 8, 610-11.

62 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
63 See Lewis, supra note 8, 611-12. For example, Lewis describes the protracted, costly discovery
process in the Lando case itself, which arose from a CBS documentary concerning Colonel
Anthony Herbert:
Mr. Lando [the documentary's producer] was deposed at twenty-eight lengthy sessions
generating almost 3000 pages of transcript . .. The last two sessions, after the Supreme Court
decision, were devoted exclusively to Lando's thought processes and editorial judgments as
he made the program; in others he was taken over volumes of his handwritten notes. Also
produced by CBS were videotapes and transcripts of all interviews done for the program,
notes of interviews conducted with 130 people, [and] all of Lando's files ....

Ibid. 611. Mike Wallace of CBS, who was a defendant in Lando, was quoted in mid-1982 as
estimating that CBS had so far spent between three and four million U.S. dollars for legal fees
in that lawsuit. Ibid. 612 (citing Kahn, 'Profiles - "60 Minutes": The Candy Factory (Part 2)',
New Yorker, July 26, 1982, 38, 42).
64 The Iowa Research Project is being conducted under the auspices of the School of Journalism
and Mass Communication and the College of Law at the University of Iowa. Its findings have
been reported in Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, Libel and the Press, Setting the Record Straight,
The 1985 Silha Lecture, University of Minnesota, May 15, 1985. Essays based upon this lecture
appear at (1985) 71 Iowa L. Rev. 215.
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most defamatory statements do not cause their subjects to incur financial
losses. Rather, the Project disclosed, the subject generally experiences only
the psychic harm attendant upon a blow to his or her reputation, particularly
when the subject is a public official or a public figure.65 The study found
that, in the wake of the Sullivan rule, defamation plaintiffs perceive the mere
act of initiating a lawsuit, independent of its outcome, as serving their
reputational goals. Simply by invoking the legal system, defamation plaintiffs
legitimize their claims of falsity. In other words, few plaintiffs sue to win;
rather, they win by the very act of suing. This conclusion is corroborated by
the fact that the vast majority of plaintiffs surveyed who had lost defamation
suits stated that they would still have sued again anyway, even had they foreseen
the unsuccessful outcomes of their actions. Even more significantly, every
single public official who lost a defamation suit and responded to the survey
said he or she would sue again notwithstanding the legal loss.66
The observed phenomenon that defamation plaintiffs believe they can
vindicate their reputations merely by initiating a lawsuit can be attributed
to Sullivan's alteration of the disputed issues in defamation actions. As noted
above, pursuant to Sullivan and Herbert v. Lando, a reporter's and editor's
state of mind for the first time became relevant in defamation actions. The
Iowa Research Project established that these novel issues are not simply
relevant in current defamation actions, but moreover, they constitute the
dominant focus of such actions. Correspondingly, the study found that, postSullivan, the previously central issues of truth or falsity, and the presence or
absence of reputational harm, are of scant significance in current defamation
litigation. 67 As the study phrased it, Sullivan's actual malice rule has
transformed the traditional tort of defamation into the novel 'tort for abuse
of constitutional privilege, regardless of truth or falsity and irrespective of
reputational harm' 6s Defamation plaintiffs are accordingly relieved of the risk
that the truth of any challenged statement will ever be confirmed. Losing
plaintiffs can 'save face' by saying they lost on the basis of the 'technicality'
of the constitutional privilege.69
In sum, because of the altered focus of defamation suits under the Sullivan
rules, defamation plaintiffs have essentially everything to gain, and very little
to lose, in terms of their paramount reputational goals. Likewise, defamation
plaintiffs often have everything to gain, and very little to lose, in economic
terms as well. Under the so-called 'American rule, an unsuccessful civil litigant
is almost never required to pay the victorious party's attorneys' fees."
Moreover, the unsuccessful defamation plaintiff will probably not even have
to pay his or her own attorneys' fees; according to the Iowa Research Project,
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Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 64, 9-11.
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about eighty per cent of defamation plaintiffs are represented pursuant to
contingency fee arrangements, and virtually all public officials who sue for
defamation are represented on a contingency basis." The defendants'
perspective, however, is exactly the opposite. In terms of both free speech and
economic concerns, defendants are inevitably the real losers of any defamation
action, regardless of its legal outcome. Thus, defamation defendants have
essentially everything to lose, and very little to gain. 2
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MEASURES TO PROMOTE GOALS UNDERLYING
SULLIVAN RULES

The facts outlined in the preceding section point to at least one reform
of current defamation procedure that would simultaneously promote the
legitimate function of such actions - to vindicate plaintiffs' reputations and advance the Sullivan goal of increasing press freedom: as a threshold
matter, defamation plaintiffs should be required to prove falsity and
reputational harm. The issue of the reporter's knowledge and intent, and other
matters bearing on the constitutional privilege, should not be reached unless
the plaintiff has satisfied this initial evidentiary burden.
A preliminary focus upon the issue of truth or falsity should alter the present
situation whereby defamation plaintiffs incur little risk to their reputational
interests by suing. Because the proposed threshold requirement would impose
upon plaintiffs a risk that they might not be able to prove the falsity of alleged
defamatory statements, it should deter some plaintiffs from commencing
defamation actions, and would therefore constitute an improvement over the
status quo from the viewpoint of defamation defendants. Even in defamation
cases that plaintiffs choose to pursue, these initial evidentiary requirements
would also effect an improvement from defendants' perspective, because they
would eliminate the burdensome discovery concerning journalists' thought
processes and editorial judgments in cases where plaintiffs could not meet
such initial burdens. Furthermore, for those defamation plaintiffs who are
primarily interested in vindicating their reputations through unequivocal
adjudications of falsity, a separate determination on that issue would also
constitute an improvement over the status quo, which often does not produce
a clear finding on such issue.
Because the primary - if not, indeed, the sole - legitimate purpose of
defamation actions is to enable plaintiffs to vindicate their reputations,73 and
because so many defamation plaintiffs suffer little or no economic injury,7"
it would be sensible to devise a new form of action that would concentrate
exclusively upon a defamed person's reputational interests. Such a new form
of action would determine only the truth or falsity of any alleged defamatory
statement and, by way of remedy, would assure correction or retraction if
Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 64, 25.
See notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 24, 749 ('compensating individuals for actual harm to
reputation is the only legitimate purpose of defamation law today').
4 See supra text accompanying note 65.
71
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the plaintiff proved the statement to be false. This type of procedure and
remedy should be advantageous both from the perspective of an individual
whose reputation has been damaged by a defamatory falsehood, and from
the perspective of the media. It should enable the defamed individual to
vindicate his claim that the challenged statement was false more promptly
and clearly than is possible through a defamation action. The proposed
procedure should also relieve the media from the great economic and
associated free press burdens they face in defamation actions, because it would
eliminate both the threat of enormous damage awards, and the intensive
probing into editorial processes, that defamation actions entail.75
The dual advantages of a procedure that would identify and correct
defamatory falsehoods, in terms of both reputational and free press concerns,
are highlighted by two dissenting opinions in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
Justice Brennan, the author of New York Times v. Sullivan and an ardent
free speech champion, dissented in Gertz because he believed the majority
opinion did not impose enough limitations upon a private plaintiff's traditional
defamation action for damages.7" Justice White dissented in Gertz for precisely
the opposite reason, asserting that the majority had imposed too many
limitations upon such actions.77 Yet, notwithstanding their opposite
perspectives concerning traditional defamation actions for damages, Justices
Brennan and White agreed that a separate vehicle should be devised to enable
a defamed plaintiff to vindicate his or her reputation without imposing
damages upon defendant." Justice Brennan expressly stated that neither his
dissenting opinion nor the majority opinion in Gertz 'should be read to imply
that a private plaintiff, unable to prove fault, must inevitably be denied the
opportunity to secure a judgment upon the truth or falsity of statements
published about him.79
The defamation law of other nations affords precedents for the proposed
non-fault-based action for retraction upon a showing of falsity. For example,
75 Any governmental compulsion upon the media to publish a retraction or correction would
probably raise constitutional questions in light of Miami HeraldPublishingCo. v. Tornillo,418
U.S. 241 (1974), which invalidated on free press grounds a statute requiring newspapers to print
political candidates' replies to editorials. The free press concerns underlying Tornillo should not
preclude the proposed retraction remedy for defamation falsehoods, however. The statute
invalidated in Tornillo granted a right of reply absent any showing that the material replied to
was false or defamatory. As Justices Brennan and Rehnguist noted in their concurring opinion,
the Court's ruling therefore 'implies no view upon the constitutionality of retraction statutes
affording plaintiffs able to prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to require publication
of a retraction! 418 U.S. 241, 258. See also Le Bel, 'Defamation and the First Amendment: The
End of the Affair', 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 779, 789-90 (1984) (proposes giving defendant choice
between paying damages for reputational injury or providing new remedy of 'repair' whereby
defendant counters false statements of fact through expenditure of equivalent resources to those
used to defame plaintiff; argues that this option eliminates potential Tornillo problem).
76 418 U.S. 323, 361-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (actual malice standard should govern
defamation actions by private figures concerning reports of their involvement in events of public
or general interest).
7 418 U.S. 323, 369-404 (White, J., dissenting) (private figure should be able to prevail in
defamation action simply by showing falsity and defamatory meaning; such a plaintiff should
not further have to show that defendant acted negligently, or with any other degree of fault).
76 418 U.S. 323, 368 (Brennan, J., dissenting); ibid. 401 (White, J., dissenting).
79 Ibid. 368 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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West Germany has done away with defamation damages altogether, and
instead merely provides a legal forum for establishing the truth or falsity of
any challenged statement.8 0 Likewise, the British House of Commons recently
considered a bill providing that a successful defamation plaintiff would not
win damages, but instead a judicial declaration of falsehood and an order
that a correction be published with the same prominence as had been accorded
to the defamatory statement.' A United States Congressman recently
proposed similar legislation, which would create a new declaratory judgment
remedy, in lieu of damages, in defamation actions by public officials or public
figures."2
From the perspective of defamation defendants, this proposed new form
of action would entail the advantage of removing the onerous economic
burdens currently associated with defamation suits. Perhaps even more
significantly, it would remove the focus of the litigation from the reporters'
state of mind, and therefore curtail the burdensome discovery into editorial
processes. For these reasons, such an action should significantly reduce the
chilling effect or self-censorship now resulting from defamation litigation. 3
From the plaintiffs' perspective, a non-fault-based action for retraction upon
a showing of falsity would more effectively serve the purpose for which most
defamation actions are instituted. As discussed above, very few defamation
victims incur financial losses as a result of the defamation. Therefore, an action
with a remedy of retraction or acknowledgement of falsehood would provide
most plaintiffs with the specific type of redress that they seek. In contrast,
as explained above, the protracted litigation in current defamation actions,
which focuses on the reporters' state of mind and not upon the truth or falsity

80 See Davila, A., Libel Law and the Press 35 (1971) (citing Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] art. 186
(W. Ger.)).
sI The Times (London), February 19, 1983.
82 H.R. 2846, 99th CONG., 1st SESS., introduced by Representative Schumer on June 24,
1985. The bill's major provisions are as follows: a public official or figure who seeks a declaratory
judgment that a published statement was false and defamatory must prove the same by clear
and convincing evidence; a plaintiff who seeks such a declaratory judgment may not recover
damages in the action, and is also barred from asserting any other claim arising out of the
challenged statement; a defendant in a defamation action brought by a public official or figure
has the right, within a limited period following commencement of the action, to designate it
as one for declaratory judgment, in which case it will be treated as if plaintiff had initially filed
a declaratory judgment action; and punitive damages are abrogated in all defamation actions.
83 The media would no doubt view it as burdensome to be compelled to retract a statement
that had been determined to be false, if the falseness were disputed. The Supreme Court's creation
of a constitutional privilege in the Sullivan case probably reflected its view that the determination
of truth or falsity in the defamation context can be difficult. Free press concerns would be promoted
by imposing upon all defamation plaintiffs the burden of proving falsity, as an element of a
prima facie claim, rather than assigning the burden of proving truth to the defendant, as an
affirmative defence. Indeed, citing free press concerns, the Supreme Court has held that public
officials and public figures must bear this burden. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979)
(public figures); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (public officials). Moreover, the
Court recently ruled that, 'at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern', even
'a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at
issue are false' PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1563 (1986). The Schumer
bill (see supra note 82), would further protect press freedom by requiring a plaintiff to prove
a challenged statement's falsity by 'clear and convincing evidence rather than by the usual
'preponderance of the evidence'
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of the allegedly defamatory statements, does not effectively vindicate plaintiffs'
reputations. That most defamation plaintiffs would be satisfied by a retraction
or similar remedy has further confirmation in the Iowa Research Project. This
study revealed that most subjects of defamatory publications rush to the
publisher, immediately after publication, to seek a retraction, correction, or
apology. Only if these efforts are unavailing do the defamed individuals
commence lawsuits. 8
The data establishing that the primary goal of defamation plaintiffs is to
secure a retraction or equivalent remedy points to another desirable reform,
albeit not of the applicable legal standards or procedures: the media themselves
should devise better methods for responding to individuals' complaints about
false, defamatory statements. The Iowa Research Project found that most
publications have no systematic method for resolving these complaints, and
typically commit such errors as leaving it to the very reporter who wrote a
story to respond to complaints about the story.85 What is suggested is voluntary
media accountability as a matter not of legal compulsion, but instead of
professional journalistic ethics.
Increased voluntary media accountability would be completely consistent
with the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. The First
Amendment insulates the United States media from accountability only to
the government. The First Amendment does not say or mean that the media
should be accountable to no one. To the contrary, respected United States
journalists have suggested that, precisely because the First Amendment
insulates the media from accountability to the government, they should be
accountable to everyone except the government.86 Not only would voluntary
media remedies for defamatory falsehoods be consistent with First
Amendment guarantees, but also, such measures should affirmatively promote
First Amendment freedoms. If the media were willing to investigate complaints
conscientiously, and to publish corrections or retractions when warranted,
the number of defamation claims reaching the courts, and the attendant
economic and other burdens upon the media, would necessarily decrease.
An additional reform that would help bring the actuality of United States
defamation law into conformity with the aims of such law, as stated in the
Sullivan line of cases, would be the elimination of punitive damages, at least
in actions by public officials.87 The purpose of punitive damages is the same
84 Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 66, 12-13, 35.
8" Ibid. 13-21.
86

Abel, supra note 33, 4.

87 At least two state supreme courts in the United States have held, as a matter of state law,

that punitive damages cannot be recovered in any defamation action. Stone v. Essex County
Newspapers, 367 Mass. 498, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777
(1979). Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court has expounded the view that the First
Amendment bars punitive damages in all defamation actions. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
403 U.S. 29, 78, 82-87 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Several scholars have endorsed this proposed
reform on a national level. See, e.g., Franklin, 'Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel
Law and a Proposal', 18 US.FL. Rev 1, 39 (1983); Smolla, 'Let the Author Beware: The
Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel', 132 U Pa L. Rev. 1, 92, 93 (1983).
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as the purpose of criminal penalties - to punish and to deter.88 But the huge
amounts of punitive damages that are awarded in defamation cases are out
of all proportion to the maximum amount of fines that could be imposed
for criminal defamation. For example, in Sullivan itself, the maximum fine
for criminal defamation was $500, but the jury awarded punitive damages
of $500,000 - one thousand times that amount.89 There is another, even more
fundamental problem with punitive damages when public officials sue for
defamation. Such damages violate the deep-seated belief that, in the United
States, citizens cannot be held criminally liable for criticizing their government
or their government officials.9" Yet, punitive damages serve precisely the same
purposes as - and are substantially more onerous than - criminal penalties.9'
Another reform conducive to press freedom would be to limit damages in
defamation actions to those that can be proven to have been caused by the
defamatory falsehood. 9 In a related vein, damages for emotional distress
should be 'parasitical' only - i.e., recoverable only if tangible economic injury
is first established.93 These limitations would reduce the likelihood that juries
will award damages not for the permissible purpose of compensating plaintiffs
for real injuries that were actually caused by the defamation, but instead for
the impermissible purpose of punishing defendants for having expressed
unpopular opinions. The proposed limitations would also bring the principles

88 See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 350 (punitive damages 'are private fines levied by civil juries to
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence').
89 376 U.S. 254, 277.
90 The Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596, is the sole statute that has purported to make the
defamation of United States public officials a crime. Although its constitutionality was never
as tested in the Supreme Court, the Court noted in Sullivan that 'the attack upon its validity
has carried the day in the court of history. 376 U.S. 254, 276. Citing actions by the contemporaneous
Congress and President, as well as Supreme Court decisions, the Sullivan opinion said:
These views reflect a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon
criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.
9 There is some evidence that punitive damage awards may reflect juries' attempts to shift
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees to defendants. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 8, 612. The availability of
punitive damage awards to defamation plaintiffs creates at least the potential for one-way feeshifting, which is inherently inequitable, because prevailing defamation defendants lack a
corresponding opportunity to recover their attorneys' fees. Under the 'American rule; the prevailing
party generally cannot recover any attorneys' fees from the opponent. See supra note 52. Of
course, a jury cannot circumvent this rule through a punitive damage award when a defendant
prevails, as it can potentially do when a plaintiff prevails. This inequity constitutes an additional
reason to abrogate punitive damages in defamation actions by public officials or figures.
92 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Marshall has set forth the view that the First Amendment
limits compensatory damages in all defamation actions to those based upon 'proved, actual injuries'
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). He said that
such a limitation would significantly reduce press fears of large damage awards that lead to selfcensorship, while simultaneously advancing 'society's interest in protecting individuals from
defamation' Ibid. In the Sullivan case itself, the New York Times counsel had urged the Court
to impose such a damage limitation upon defamation actions by public officials. See supra note 8.
93 For a scholarly endorsement of this proposed limitation, see Anderson, supra note 24,
758-63 (1984) (noting that tort law historically has refused to compensate emotional injuries alone,
in part because of inability to determine objectively whether injuries have occurred). At least
one respected journalist and scholar has proposed that damages for emotional distress should
never be recoverable in defamation actions, even when actual economic injury has been proven,
because such damages 'allow juries to speculate at large and in effect bring back presumed
damages' Lewis, supra note 8, 615.
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governing damages in defamation actions into conformity with the principles
governing damages in other tort actions. 9
CONCLUSION

As James Madison pointed out during the debates on the United States
Constitution: 'Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press 95
Accepting this proposition, the Supreme Court has recognized, in the Sullivan
line of cases, that toleration of some abuse of press freedom constitutes the
necessary price for the proper use of such freedom. For example, in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court stated:
[Plunishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize that
[common law defamation rules] may lead to intolerable96self-censorship ... and [do] not accord
adequate protection to First Amendment liberties.

The Court created and implemented the actual malice rule in Sullivan and
its progeny in order to avert self-censorship and to give adequate breathing
space to First Amendment liberties. Because the actual malice rule has not
effectively served the compelling goals underlying it, those goals should instead
be pursued through reforms such as the ones proposed in this paper.

94 See supra notes 24, 89.

95 Elliot, supra note 11, 571.
9' 418 U.S. 323, 340.

